Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions by Wu, Tim
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2005 
Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions 
Tim Wu 
Columbia Law School, twu@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, VOL. 92, P. 123, 
2006; UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PUBLIC LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 97 (2005). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1367 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 










N 1945, Fredrick Hayek described the problem of economic 
development as “a problem of the utilization of knowledge 
not given to anyone in its totality.”1 Hayek’s insight has unex-
pected relevance for what has emerged as the central question 
in modern intellectual property and related fields: When might 
the assignment of property rights have anti-competitive conse-
quences? The traditional, yet central, economic answer to this 
question emphasizes a tradeoff between incentives created by 
property grants and resulting higher prices and deadweight 
losses.2 Under this model intellectual property grants are de-
sirable to the extent that they encourage new product devel-
opment at a reasonable cost. 
I 
Both the above quotation from Hayek and a growing body of 
scholarship suggest that this is the wrong way to assess the 
problem. This scholarship suggests that the most important 
economic effects of intellectual property may not be effects on 
price, but rather on industry structure. According to this view, 
we must weigh the benefits of intellectual property assign-
∗ Professor, Columbia Law School. I thank Kevin Outterson, Richard Posner, 
Randal Picker, Eric Posner, Mark Lemley, Lior Strahilevitz, Ed Felten, and Luis 
Garicano for the discussion and ideas that led to this paper. I also thank the 
participants in the Chicago Intellectual Property and Antitrust Seminar. This 
paper was drafted with the financial support of the University of Chicago. A re-
lated draft was presented at UCLA Law School and the Chicago Law School 
Work in Progress Workshop. I thank Wayne Hsiung for research assistance. 
1 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 520 
(1945). 
2 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Insti-
tutional Economics, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1857, 1857–58 (2000) (discussing dead-
weight loss analysis and its limits). 
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ments, which include subsidizing or making possible desirable 
economic activity, against the costs of the centralization of eco-
nomic decisionmaking and the creation of barriers to innova-
tion and market entry. 
This Essay discusses a crucial aspect of this problem: the ef-
fect of rights assignments on the decision architectures of af-
fected industries.3 Industry decisionmaking is not a topic of 
mere abstract interest. It is central to the economic perform-
ance of firms, industries, and entire nations. Professors Joseph 
Stiglitz and Raaj Sah have argued that different systems of 
product development may account for the variation in 
performances of planned and market economies.5 Hayek simi-
larly focused on decentralized versus centralized use of infor-
mation as central to a “rational economic order.”6 To the extent 
that intellectual property assignments affect product develop-
ment decisionmaking, and to the extent such assignments 
cover more and more industries, their effects may be funda-
mental to the performance of the economies of the future. 
In the high-technology field, an example of the perils of cen-
tralized decisionmaking comes from Japan’s “Fifth Generation 
Project.” In the 1980s, the Japanese government, consulting 
with experts, predicted where computer technology would be in 
ten years. The government then launched a huge national ef-
fort to build the predicted technologies, hoping to leapfrog 
other countries. As a 1984 article explained,  
3 Some of the work relied upon includes Eric von Hippel, Democratizing Inno-
vation (2005); Jane Jacobs, The Nature of Economies (2000); Paul Milgrom & 
John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management 113–24 (1992); Pat-
rick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, The Firm as a Communication Network, 
109 Q.J. Econ. 809 (1994); Luis Garicano, Hierarchies and the Organization of 
Knowledge in Production, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 874 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, The 
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989 
(1997); Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Sys-
tems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 716 (1986) [hereinafter 
Sah & Stiglitz, Hierarchries and Polyarchies]; Raaj K. Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations, 
106 Q.J. Econ. 289 (1991) [hereinafter Sah & Stiglitz, Centralized Versus De-
centralized Organizations]; David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Be-
havior and Investment, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 465 (1990).  
5 See Sah & Stiglitz, Hierarchies and Polyarchies, supra note 4, at 716, 726. 
6 See Hayek, supra note 1, at 524–28. 
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[t]he Japanese are planning the miracle product. It will come 
not from their mines, their wells, their fields, or even their 
seas. It comes instead from their brains. . . . They’re going to 
give the world the next generation—Fifth Generation—of 
computers, and those machines are going to be intelligent.7  
The project was, unfortunately, centered on the mistaken be-
lief that mainframe computers would remain dominant and 
that parallel supercomputing was the key to the future. It 
completely missed other less grandiose innovations, like the 
personal computer, the graphical user interface on the Apple 
Macintosh, and the computer networking now called the 
Internet. The project was an abject failure that damaged the 
Japanese computer industry. “[F]ew of the Fifth Generation 
project’s original goals were achieved: Critics pronounced it a 
complete failure, while supporters were confined to citing col-
lateral benefits such as researcher training.”8 
These points offer an important warning for industries regu-
lated by intellectual property. While we may accept that intel-
lectual property offers strong ex ante incentives to innovate (as 
did the Fifth Generation project), there is a flip-side danger of 
too much centralization of decisionmaking. Though the risk 
posed by governmental initiatives like Japan’s Fifth Genera-
tion project may seem foreign, intellectual property policies 
practiced in the United States historically have created similar 
consequences. For example, in 1892, the United States granted 
an exceptionally broad patent to Thomas Edison for his light 
bulb. The result was to centralize light bulb decisionmaking in 
the Edison company for approximately twelve years.9 The re-
7 See Edward Feigenbaum & Pamela McCorduck, The Fifth Generation: Ja-
pan’s Computer Challenge to the World, Creative Computing, Aug. 1984, at 103, 
104, available at 
http://www.atarimagazines.com/creative/v10n8/103_The_fifth_generation_Jap.p
hp. 
8 See Joel West, Utopianism and National Competitiveness in Technology 
Rhetoric: The Case of Japan’s Information Infrastructure, 12 Info. Soc’y 251, 
256(1996). I thank Ed Felten for this point. 
9 See Arthur A. Bright, Jr., The Electric-Lamp Industry: Technological Change 
and Economic Development from 1800 to 1947, at 88–91 (1949); Robert P. 
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
Colum. L. Rev. 839, 885–88 (1990). 
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sults were not inspiring. Improvement in incandescent lighting 
became a one-company show, and many competitors were put 
out of business. Economists who have studied the period note 
that technological progress in lighting slowed, as “the broad 
Edison patent slowed down progress in the incandescent light-
ing field.”10 
The economic literature on decisionmaking architectures 
aids understanding of these scenarios. It makes an important 
and useful distinction between hierarchical (centralized) and 
polyarchical (decentralized) decision architectures.11 In the 
former, decisions are made centrally by a few individuals with 
others providing support. A polyarchy, conversely, is charac-
terized by multiple, potentially competing decisionmakers who 
may undertake projects independently. The key point of this 
Essay is that the government’s decisions with respect to prop-
erty assignments can steer decision architectures toward a 
polyarchical or hierarchical architecture. In general, broad 
rights or rights held by a limited number of parties promote a 
hierarchical decision architecture. Conversely, diffuse rights or 
non-assignment of rights leads to the market default: polyar-
chical decisionmaking architectures, where any firm or indi-
vidual may decide to undertake a new project. 
This distinction gives us a new perspective on when intellec-
tual property rights should be assigned and their optimal 
scope. In general, the economic literature strongly favors de-
centralized decision structures in economic systems, based on 
the observation that free-market economies perform better 
than planned, centralized economies. Even accepting that use-
ful incentives can be created by intellectual property, the ef-
fects on decisionmaking suggest a reason to be cautious about 
the assignment of broad rights. The danger is that centraliza-
tion of investment decisionmaking may block the best or most 
innovative ideas from coming to market. This concern must be 
weighed against the desirable incentives and subsidies created 
by an intellectual property grant. 
10 Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 887. 
11 See, e.g., Sah & Stiglitz, Hierarchies and Polyarchies, supra note 4, at 716. 
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Two points must be raised against this presumption in favor 
of decentralized architectures. First, the danger of over-
centralization can be moderated by numerous policies. The 
various exceptions and limitations to copyright and patent, 
such as the improvement doctrine in patent or the fair use doc-
trine in copyright, can help serve this function. One insight of 
this Essay is to suggest that the primary importance of such 
doctrines should be understood differently. They must be un-
derstood as justified by their promotion of decentralized 
decisionmaking in product development.  
Second, despite this presumption in favor of decentraliza-
tion, there also are certain scenarios where the economic lit-
erature suggests that hierarchical structures may perform bet-
ter. Given an initial mixture of good and bad (profitable and 
unprofitable) ideas, hierarchies will tend to filter out too many 
good ideas but make fewer mistakes. Decentralized polyar-
chies, meanwhile, invest in more bad projects, and even out-
right fiascoes, but also more new and innovative ideas. There 
may be certain industries where avoidance of errors is of pre-
eminent importance; for example, experiments with dangerous 
viruses or nuclear energy. In such instances, there may be spe-
cial reasons to favor hierarchical product development. 
Part I will introduce the distinction between hierarchies and 
polyarchical decision architectures. Part II will discuss the re-
lationship between intellectual property and innovation policy. 
Part III will ask how the analysis in this Essay might influ-
ence intellectual property policy. 
I. DECENTRALIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION 
The economic literature has developed an overwhelming 
bias in favor of decentralized economic decisionmaking, reflect-
ing the disastrous economic performance of planned econo-
mies. The basic argument was made most memorably by 
Fredrick Hayek and goes as follows.12 Centralized economic 
planning, in a world of perfect information, has clear advan-
tages over decentralized decisionmaking. Ideally, it eliminates 
duplication: two gas stations on a single street corner, provid-
12 See Hayek, supra note 1, at 519, 524. 
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ing the same function, are wasteful, or “rent-dissipating.” Cen-
tral planning also eliminates many market failures such as ex-
ternalities, collective action problems, and so on. The problem 
with centralized planning is not that it would not be efficient. 
The problem, rather, is that no central planner can possibly 
have all of the necessary local and national information to 
make the right decisions. As Hayek wrote: 
If we possess all the relevant information, if we can start out 
from a given system of preferences and if we command com-
plete knowledge of available means, the problem which re-
mains is purely one of logic. . . . This, however, is emphati-
cally not the economic problem which society faces. . . . [T]he 
“data” from which the economic calculus starts are never for 
the whole society “given” to a single mind which could work 
out the implications, and can never be so given.13 
The failure to appreciate these points in the twentieth century 
arguably led to various failed decisional experiments, such as 
China’s Great Leap Forward or Stalin’s five-year plans. 
Since Hayek’s time, other economists have taken new inter-
est in the problems of decisionmaking and the transmission of 
information within organizations. As for Hayek, the central 
question across a variety of contexts is how performance is af-
fected by centralization or decentralization of decisionmaking 
authority. For example, given a manufacturing firm that must 
choose among products to invest in developing, will the firm be 
more profitable if (1) decentralized units decide on products, or 
(2) every project is approved by a centralized structure before 
resources are committed? 
The contemporary economic literature begins with a central 
assumption—one often missing from the existing legal intellec-
tual property literature. The assumption is that human deci-
sions are fallible.14 Decisionmakers act on imperfect informa-
tion for a number of reasons, including limited time and the 
13 Id. at 519. 
14 See Raaj K. Sah, Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems, 
J. Econ. Persp., Spring 1991, at 67, 67–68 (discussing the assumption of human 
fallibility). 
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costs and erroneous nature of information transmission.15 As a 
result, they make many mistakes. They cannot be certain, in 
advance, which of a portfolio of new products will actually be 
profitable and warrant investment. Product development and 
innovation, based on this simple assumption, is a highly error-
prone exercise. 
Based on that premise, economists have distinguished two 
basic decision architectures designed to weed out errors: pol-
yarchies and hierarchies, corresponding to decentralized and 
centralized structures, respectively.16 A polyarchy is a com-
pletely decentralized decision architecture: any single actor’s 
approval of a project is sufficient. Conversely, in a hierarchy, 
the approval architecture is modeled as a serial 
decisionmaking process requiring all parties to approve a pro-
ject for it to go forward. The simplest two-actor versions of 
each of these decision architectures can be pictured as follows 






























Figure 1: Polyarchy and Hierarchy  
15 See Bolton & Dewatripont, supra note 4, at 809–11. 
16 For more detailed models of polyarchies and hierarchies, see, for example, 
Patrick Bolton & Joseph Farrell, Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay, 98 J. 
Pol. Econ. 803, 803–06 (1990); Sah & Stiglitz, Hierarchies and Polyarchies, su-
pra note 4, at 716. 
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As discussed above, a critical assumption is that in both sys-
tems, choosing successful products is difficult (this matches 
the real world, where a small percentage of new products suc-
ceed).17 The relevant decisionmakers make two types of mis-
takes: they filter out projects that are in fact profitable (what 
statisticians call Type I errors) and also fail to squash projects 
destined to fail (Type II errors). The difference, then, is in the 
kinds of errors that dominate in a hierarchy and polyarchy. 
Under basic assumptions, a polyarchy like that described here 
will generally approve more projects than a hierarchy.18 This 
can be shown intuitively based on the diagram above. If for a 
given project P, both A and B have a fifty percent chance of 
approving it, the polyarchy will approve the project seventy-
percent of the time, while the hierarchy will approve it twenty-
five percent of the time. As a result, the polyarchy will commit 
fewer errors of a “missed-opportunity” nature (Type I errors), 
but more errors of the “bad-investment” nature (Type II er-
rors). The opposite is true for hierarchies: the cost of a hierar-
chy is a greater rejection of projects that should have been ac-
cepted. 
Given their different capabilities, when will decentralized 
decision architectures outperform hierarchies and vice versa? 
That question is a topic of growing economic literature.19 An 
17 See Booz, Allen & Hamilton Inc., New Products Management for the 1980s, 
at 2–3 (1982) (showing that most new products fail). There is related literature 
that tries to capitalize on a different mode of innovation to prevent errors, 
namely innovations created by “lead users.” These users have particularized in-
formation as to how a product might be improved. See von Hippel, supra note 4, 
at 22–23. 
18 See Sah & Stiglitz, Hierarchies and Polyarchies, supra note 4, at 724–25. 
19 Other authors have focused on the nature of the relevant information to be 
transmitted as favoring either centralized or decentralized decisionmaking. In-
formation that might be easier to transmit (“hard” information), like numbers, 
can be handled well by a hierarchy, while “soft” information, such as a subjec-
tive assessment of managerial ability, might be better processed by decentral-
ized actors. See Jeremy C. Stein, Information Production and Capital Allocation: 
Decentralized Versus Hierarchical Firms, 57 J. Fin. 1891, 1891–93 (2002). Pat-
rick Bolton and Joseph Farrell also have emphasized the relative quickness of 
centralized decisionmaking structures, which seems less important in the intel-
lectual property context. See Bolton & Farrell, supra note 16, at 805–06, 816. 
This literature is not relevant here. 
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early but important answer to this question focuses on the 
relative scarcity of profitable ideas. Professors Joseph Stiglitz 
and Raaj Sah demonstrated that a polyarchy should be ex-
pected to outperform a hierarchy in an environment where 
profitable ideas are scarce and vice versa.20 The reasoning fol-
lows from the premise: Since polyarchies by design reject fewer 
projects, they manage to capture the few available profitable 
ideas. Conversely, where good ideas are plentiful, polyarchies 
create waste by approving too many bad projects. A useful cor-
ollary is that the performance of a polyarchy or hierarchy de-
pends on the information environment.21 In a period of great 
change or uncertainty, the most fruitful line of inquiry may be 
difficult to ascertain, making the ability of polyarchies to turn 
up innovative ideas particularly useful. Conversely, in a highly 
stable environment, accuracy may be more important.22 
This work, as we will see, has direct relevance to intellectual 
property problems.23 But before exploring those questions we 
turn first to the traditional framework for understanding the 
relationship between intellectual property and innovation. 
20 See Sah & Stiglitz, Hierarchies and Polyarchies, supra note 4, at 719. 
21 Cf. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Eco-
nomics, Nobel Prize Lecture (Dec. 8, 2001), in Les Prix Nobel, The Nobel Prizes 
2001, at 472, 503–06 (Tore Frangsmyr ed., 2002), available at 
http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/2001/stiglitz-lecture.pdf (discussing 
the effects of asymmetric information on behavior of individuals in the market). 
22 The evolutionary economics literature reaches similar results, albeit based 
on different assumptions and models that will not be detailed here. Professors 
Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter emphasized the uncertainty and contingency 
of technological outcomes. Their models predict multiple possible equilibria, 
rather than a single, predictable outcome. See Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. 
Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change 14–16 (1982). Firms de-
pend on a set of routines that survive unless the firm dies or manages to mutate 
its way of doing business. That suggests, as does the decentralization literature, 
the importance of a trial-and-error approach to innovation decisionmaking in 
uncertain information environments. 
23 In other work, Sah and Stiglitz also showed that hierarchies tend to vary in 
quality much more than polyarchies. See Sah & Stiglitz, Centralized Versus De-
centralized Organizations, supra note 4, at 289–90. In other words, a good  hier-
archical decisionmaking architecture will perform far better than a polyarchy, 
but a bad hierarchy makes the worst decisions of all. This is similar to the old 
point that the best monarchy is better than the best democracy, but the worst 
monarchy is worse than the worst democracy. Polyarchies in this view have 
something of a leveling effect on the quality of decisionmaking. 
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II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION 
A. Costs and Benefits of Intellectual Property 
 
The classic analysis of intellectual property and innovation 
is a comparison of dynamic benefits and static costs.24 The 
benefit of a government’s promise to grant intellectual prop-
erty rights is the creation of incentives to invest in the re-
search and development of new products. The static costs are 
measured as consumer deadweight loss resulting from higher 
pricing, the result of market power conferred by intellectual 
property. The optimal assignment of intellectual property 
rights must balance the incentives created against the dead-
weight loss. The graph usually used to show the costs of intel-














Figure 2: The Costs of Intellectual Property  
 
This model remains the starting point, but today few believe 
that it delivers a full picture of the costs or benefits of intellec-
tual property. The critical economic scholarship can be divided 
into three categories: one group emphasizing neglected costs, 
another group, neglected benefits, and a third challenging the 
model itself. On the cost side, a major insight is that property 
24 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 32–45 (6th ed. 2003). 
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rights can potentially create barriers to market entry. In pat-
ent, a number of authors have suggested that firms build pat-
ent “thickets” that block their more innovative competitors.25 
Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg have high-
lighted transaction costs made necessary by the collection of 
rights—what they term an “anti-commons” problem.26 In other 
articles, Professor Randy Picker and I have written on the use 
of copyright to mediate or block the market entry of new dis-
semination technologies.27 
On the benefit side, a number of scholars have suggested 
that the assignment of intellectual property rights may have 
static benefits—that IP rights may be useful independent of 
any incentives created. This remains a highly controversial 
proposition. The first to advance the argument was Professor 
Edmund Kitch, who argued that broad patent grants create 
“prospects” that can eliminate wasteful duplicative research 
and promote orderly development of a new invention.28 Kitch’s 
premise was disputed by Professors Robert Merges and Rich-
ard Nelson, based on a series of case studies of industries un-
der broad patents.29 Professor William Landes and Judge 
Richard Posner, while parting company with Kitch over the 
usefulness of prospect patents, do nonetheless emphasize the 
static benefits of intellectual property in other contexts, stress-
25 See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox 
Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 
1979–1995, 32 RAND J. Econ. 101, 102 (2001).  
26 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698–700 (1998), avail-
able at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698. 
27 See Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distri-
bution, 47 Antitrust Bull. 423 (2002); Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications 
Policy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 278, 341–66 (2004). 
28 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 
J.L. & Econ. 265, 265–66, 278 (1977); see also Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexan-
der, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va. L. Rev. 305, 308 (1992) (arguing 
that the purpose of patent is primarily preventing rent dissipation); Martin 
Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez, An Empirical Study of the Patent Prospect 
Theory: An Evaluation of Antispam Patents 1–5 (Sept. 1, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=796289. 
29 Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 871–78, 884–915. 
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ing reductions of transaction costs.30 Professor Clarisa Long 
has suggested that patents may be used by firms to signal 
their technological prowess.31 Professor Douglas Lichtman’s 
work also emphasizes static benefits, including price-
coordination functions of intellectual property and evidentiary 
functions of copyright.32 These static justifications for intellec-
tual property are not accepted by everyone. Professor Mark 
Lemley, for example, calls them “ex post” justifications that 
are “strikingly anti-market.”33 
Finally, some challenge the economic assumptions underly-
ing the model or address different models. Edmund Kitch, for 
example, is skeptical that the demand curve for intellectual 
propery-based products will have a negative slope and ques-
tions the assumption that intellectual property rights create 
real market power.34 Mark Lemley suggests the model that 
fails to direct sufficient attention to how intellectual property 
law treats improvers, as opposed to the original inventors.35 
Building on this literature, both in this Essay and other 
work,36 I argue that we should assess intellectual property as-
signments by their effects on industry structure. In this model, 
the chief benefit of intellectual property is to subsidize selected 
industries whose assets are vulnerable to misappropriation. 
The chief costs are (1) the use of intellectual property rights to 
block or delay the market entry of threats to intellectual prop-
erty owners, and (2) the centralization of decisionmaking 
30 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of In-
tellectual Property Law 12–13, 318–25 (2003); Douglas Lichtman, Property 
Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. Legal Stud. 615, 619–20 
(2000). 
31 See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 627–28, 643–44 
(2002). 
32 See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 Duke L.J. 683, 
686–87 (2003) (describing sections of copyright as motivated by an evidentiary 
function); Lichtman, supra note 31, at 619 (arguing that intellectual property 
law should encourage price coordination in emerging technology contexts). 
33 Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual 
Property, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 129, 132 (2004). 
34 See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic 
Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1727, 1729–31 (2000). 
35 Lemley, supra note 4, at 1048–67. 
36 See Wu, supra note 27; Timothy Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2006). 
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within the industry. The intuition is not that other costs and 
benefits described in the literature are irrelevant, but rather 
that they are less significant to national economic performance 
than the long-term effects on industry structure. 
 The remainder of this section develops point (2) above by 
providing a means for assessing how intellectual property as-
signments may affect an industry’s decisionmaking. 
B. Model of Intellectual Property and Investment Decisions  
The model presented here assesses intellectual property in-
dependent of the costs and benefits central to the monopoly 
pricing model. It assumes, initially, that both the incentives 
and deadweight losses are inconsequential in a competitive 
market.37 The purpose is to emphasize a neglected conse-
quence—the effect of property assignments on product devel-
opment decisions in the industries influenced by intellectual 
property. The central argument is that the government’s as-
signment of property rights can influence the decisionmaking 
architecture for the economic system surrounding a given in-
tellectual property grant. 
Consider an invention Y that will be a necessary component 
for a portfolio of possible products, named P1 . . . Pn. Some of 
the products will be profitable, others not, but consistent with 
our assumptions of imperfect information their profitability is 
hard to know in advance. 
The government in our model has two policy options: (1) to 
award a patent to F1 (the inventor) or (2) not to award this pro-
tection. The patent in this model gives F1 an inalienable right 
to enjoin the use of Y. The right, in other words, cannot be li-
censed—like most of the royal grant of letters patent in seven-
teenth-century England.38 Should the government decide to 
award the patent, the decisional consequences of that decision 
are as follows: F1 has the sole authority to decide which of 
37 This is an unrealistic assumption for most industries. The assumption is re-
laxed in Part III. 
38 The assumption is relaxed later in this Part. For a description of the work-
ings of English letters patent, see Thomas Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, 
and the Politics of Regulation, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1313, 1324–27 (2005). 
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P1 . . . Pn is profitable and should be developed. While it can so-
licit advice and so on, the government, in our model, has 
mandated through patent that the final decision is F1’s to 


















Conversely, if government does not award a patent in Y, 
then a set of firms F1. . . Fn can decide to develop whatever 
products P1. . . Pn they think are profitable. That decision ar-





























Figure 4: Decisional Consequences of Not Awarding Patent  
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A natural question is whether policy (1) or (2) will lead to 
higher profit and better economic performance. The conse-
quence that this model emphasizes is the effect on the decision 
architecture surrounding invention Y. The results of the gov-
ernment’s decision will be a wholly different pattern of product 
innovation and development. The centralized and decentral-
ized decision structures will yield investments in different 
portfolios of products yielding different economic outcomes. 
Over time, the history of the industry dependent on Y may 
look very different. 
A simple historical example may help illustrate the model. 
Consider an industry like the latenineteenth-century automo-
bile industry, headed by a promising invention like the auto-
mobile.39 In 1895, the U.S. government granted a patent in the 
automobile to a man named George Selden. It decided to allo-
cate to Selden the authority to decide whether any project in-
volving the basic elements of a car (an internal-combustion en-
gine connected to a drive shaft) would go forward.40 By this 
decision, the government created an initial decisional architec-
ture for the automobile sector: a perfect hierarchy. Selden held 
the theoretical right to decide what projects to approve or dis-
approve in the car industry. Though there are many ideas as 
to what a profitable car might be, the power to make that deci-
sion rested entirely with Selden.41 
At this point we can understand clearly the difference be-
tween the present model and the classic model. The idea that 
patent or copyright can block competition is a familiar part of 
the classic model. Yet its effect has been understood as block-
ing price competition, leading to deadweight loss. What the 
model here suggests is slightly different. It emphasizes the 
blocking of decisionmaking capacity among potential competi-
tors to the rights holder. That is, the relevance of an intellec-
tual property grant is not only that competitors cannot com-
39 This example also is discussed in Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 888–91. 
40 U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (issued Nov. 5, 1895). 
41 As Robert Merges and Richard Nelson have documented, one could readily 
speculate that the effect of the Selden patent was to slow the development of 
automobiles for quite some time. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 888–90. 
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pete on price, but that they cannot develop projects that they 
consider profitable without the permission of the rights-owner. 
*** 
The most unrealistic assumption of the model just described 
is that the patent right in question cannot be transferred or li-
censed. While inalienable rights were usually the original 
model of royal letters patent42 and still exist to some extent, 
inalienable rights are no longer the dominant model. In U.S. 
patent and copyright law, the initial allocation of 
decisionmaking authority is not a final allocation.43 The rights 
holder can either create a decentralized decision structure 
within his own firm or license others to use the invention in an 
open manner, if doing so would yield maximum profitability. 
What happens when we relax the assumption of inalienabil-
ity? This leads to an analysis of what decisions the rights 
holder will make. The two questions are (1) whether the rights 
holder will create an efficiently decentralized internal struc-
ture44 and (2) whether the rights holder will license efficiently 
to create an optimal decisional structure. A basic insight is 
that the initial inventor will often but not always create either 
an efficient internal structure or license when doing so would 
be socially optimal. 
The first question suggests that to the extent that overly 
centralized decisionmaking might be sub-optimal, we might 
expect the rights holder to create a decentralized product de-
velopment system within the firm. Unfortunately, the chal-
lenges of creating decentralized structures within firms are 
well known.45 The reason is that minimal firm coherence re-
quires uniformity in many practices, such as personnel, firm 
culture, and other internal rules. The resulting in-firm decen-
tralization may be incomplete and artificial.46 Generally speak-
42 See Nachbar, supra note 38, at 1326–27. 
43 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000). 
44 The assumption of inalienability is irrelevant to this question. 
45 See Richard A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in 
the Wake of 9/11, at 127–62 (2005). 
46  For further discussion of the idea in the intelligence sector, see id. at 134–
38. 
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ing, a system of competing firms better resembles a decentral-
ized decisional architecture than a large firm that has created 
internal decentralization. 
The second question raises a familiar problem in both the 
intellectual property and telecommunications literature: the 
problem of efficient licensing.47 In general, we should expect a 
firm to license its intellectual property to maximize subse-
quent innovation because that maximizes the licensing value 
of the property in the first place.48 There are, however, a num-
ber of exceptions to this observation. We can consider three 
scenarios where efficient licensing so as to create appropriately 
decentralized decisionmaking may not occur. 
The first may be found where the firm is subject to extensive 
government pricing regulations. In such a case, a firm may 
have strong reasons to want to keep its inventions to itself—
namely, the prospect of unregulated revenue.49 If, for example, 
Bell’s central technology (voice) is subject to price caps, it may 
keep a new technology (DSL) to itself to try and capture the 
monopoly profits it is denied in its primary market. This point 
is simply a corollary of Baxter’s law, which suggests that regu-
lated monopolists, unlike other monopolists, may rationally 
seek monopoly profits in vertical input industries.50 
A second exception arises in the presence of positive public 
externalities. These are scenarios where broad licensing would 
be good for society but where the benefits are hard for the 
rights holder to capture and even potentially harmful to it.51 
47 For a discussion of where platform owners license efficiently, see Joseph 
Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access 
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet 
Age, 17 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 85, 97–101 (2003). 
48 For a discussion of related issues, see Lemley, supra note 4. 
49 Cf. Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regula-
tion: United S ates v. AT&T, in The Antitrust Revolution 290, 291–95 (John E. 
Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989) (describing how the Bell System 
performed well and prospered under the regime of regulated monopoly). 
t
50See William F. Baxter, Conditions Creating Antitrust Concerns with Vertical 
Integration by Regulated Industries--'For Whom the Bell Doctrine Tolls, '52 
Antitrust L.J. 243 (1983) (describing what William Baxter modestly called the 
“Bell Doctrine,” and what others call Baxter’s Law). 
51 This view also is expressed in the argument that monopolists typically have 
reduced incentives to innovate. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and 
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This can happen when the inventing firm is a dominant firm 
using the prior technology.52 For example, in the automobile 
example, the owner of the car patent also might be a dominant 
manufacturer of horse-drawn buggies. In that case, the manu-
facturer might want to screen inventions that might challenge 
the buggy(like passenger sedans) favoring instead inventions 
that are no challenge to its existing market position (like trac-
tors). The history of copyright and communications technolo-
gies typifies this problem, where the holders of copyright block 
or slow dissemination technologies of potentially broad social 
value that threaten an existing market position.53 Television 
broadcasters, for example, blocked cable television,54 and over 
the last decade the existing radio industry has successfully 
blocked the arrival of new “low-power” FM stations.55 
The evolutionary economic literature provides particular in-
sight into this problem with its distinction between “sustain-
ing” and “disruptive” innovations.56 Those in the first category 
simply make a present business model more efficient, like an 
automatic transmission for a car or a record player that plays 
music more clearly. Disruptive innovations, conversely, 
threaten the market position of firms reliant on existing tech-
nology. The car did not improve but replaced the horse and 
buggy, and as our Japanese friends found out, the personal 
computer did not merely complement the mainframe, but ul-
timately replaced it. In such cases, broad licensing might be 
socially efficient but also might mean the death of the licens-
the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 5 Collected Papers of Kenneth J. 
Arrow: Production and Capital 104, 114–17 (1985) (concluding that the monopo-
list’s incentive to innovate is less than the inventor in competitive industries). 
52 See Wu, supra note 27, at 292–95; Timothy Wu, Network Neutrality, Broad-
band Discrimination, J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 141, 149–51 (2003) (ex-
plaining discrimination in the broadband context). 
53 See Wu, supra note 27, at 292–95. 
54 See id. at 311–24. 
55 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First 
Amendment Violation, 52 Duke L.J. 1, 16–17 (2002) (“The campaign against low 
power FM led Bill Kennard, then Chair of the FCC, to comment sardonically 
that ‘[t]he only real interference to Low Power FM radio is from high priced 
Washington lobbyists.’”). 
56 See Clayton M. Christensen & Michael E. Raynor, The Innovator’s Solution 
34–35 (2003). 
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ing firm because the firm may have no comparative advantage 
using the new form of technology. Since few firms plan for 
their own death, even if their death is in the public interest, 
the temptation to bury a disruptive innovation may be strong 
indeed.57 
The third exception, consistent with our assumptions of hu-
man nature, is the effect of pride, laziness, or incompetence. 
Granted a broad patent or copyright on a popular product, a 
firm may simply refuse to license decentralized improvement 
because it wants to retain maximum control and is comfortable 
with its expected returns. It is, for example, rare to see multi-
ple film versions of a given copyrighted novel, even though one 
might expect that decentralized competition among films 
might serve the public interest. On the patent side, the owner 
of a patented invention may wrongly but proudly believe that 
he alone possesses the insights to make the best improvements 
and refuse to license decentralized improvement on that basis. 
This is reportedly the stance taken by the Wright Brothers, 
patent holders on several crucial inventions related to the air-
plane. As Professors Nelson and Merges put it: 
[T]he Wright brothers were very interested in producing air-
craft and in improving their design, and they did so actively. 
However, there were other important people and companies 
who wanted to enter the aircraft design and manufacture 
business. They had their own ideas about how to advance the 
design of aircraft, and they strongly resisted being blocked 
by the Wright patent.58 
Human error, in short, is not the exception but the rule, and 
its absence in licensing practice would be surprising. The more 
general point is this: Where licensing is possible, the effects of 
a grant of rights may be hard to predict, as it depends on a 
rights holder’s attitude toward decentralized improvement. 
Conversely, the effects of non-assignment are more predict-
able. This point is developed in the remainder of this Essay. 
57 Id. 
58 Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 890. 
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III. A HAYEKIAN APPROACH TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The Essay so far has sought to establish that decisions re-
lated to assignment of intellectual property rights can help 
centralize or decentralize decisionmaking relevant to intellec-
tual property dependent products. But what can this analysis 
can tell us about intellectual property policy in general? 
This final Part discusses three areas where the approach of 
this Essay might make an impact on intellectual property 
questions. 
A. Subject Matter 
The government is often faced with decisions as to whether 
intellectual property should exist at all, either for an industry 
or for a type of product or invention. With the arrival of every 
new industry—automobiles, airplanes, software, computers, 
internet auctions—there is always some question as to 
whether or when intellectual property rights of some form 
should attach. Over the last several decades, for example, the 
patentability of software, living creatures, and business meth-
ods has been controversial.59 The analysis here shows that 
these problems can be reframed as a choice about the decision 
architecture for the industry in question. 
Consistent with the Hayekian analysis used here, the pre-
sumption should run against assigning intellectual property 
rights in new industries. The reason is decisional: Decentral-
ized industry structures seem to have the strongest track re-
cord for inculcating innovation and economic growth. The ab-
sence of intellectual property rights, absent additional 
significant barriers to market entry, should yield the default 
result of a decentralized decision architecture. 
The giant exception to this presumption is where the indus-
try in question faces serious prospects of asset misappropria-
tion that will deter investment. Drawing investment into an 
industry that could not exist absent protection is the strongest 
59 See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: 
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 577, 581–84 (1999) (discussing the evolution of patent’s subject mat-
ter coverage). 
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reason to grant intellectual property rights. But absent evi-
dence of such a problem, the analysis here suggests that the 
assignment of intellectual property rights will hinder, rather 
than foster, optimal product development and consequently 
economic growth. 
Two examples illustrate this reasoning. Business-method 
patents were first authorized by the Federal Circuit in 1998.60 
The court decided that the inventor of a new method of busi-
ness could obtain a patent just like any other inventor. A ma-
jor consequence of business-method patents, if widespread, is 
decisional in nature. They can flip the basic decentralized na-
ture of deciding how to run a business and improve it in a 
given industry. For example, if Federal Express were awarded 
a patent on its (once innovative) overnight delivery business 
method, it would become a centralized decision maker as to the 
future of overnight delivery services. It is true that having a 
single courier company eliminates some errors and duplication 
of resources, but this comes at the cost of suppressing new 
ideas for improving the overnight courier method. This cost, 
moreover, often will be unjustified by any particular danger 
that the danger of misappropriation will destroy the industry 
absent government protection. 
A second example is broadcast spectrum reform, which has 
been under consideration for about a decade in the United 
States. The question is whether broadcasting at certain fre-
quencies should be propertized. In other words, the question is 
whether some firm should own the alienable rights to 
broadcast between frequencies X and Y. The impact of the gov-
ernment’s decision whether to grant property rights or not will 
have important decisional consequences. Granting no rights 
will create decentralized market entry for spectrum-dependent 
projects or technologies.61 Any entity willing to make the in-
vestment may develop a project that depends on access to 
spectrum, albeit at the cost of many failed projects. Granting 
government-specified licenses or property rights, conversely, 
60 See State St. Bank & Trust. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375–
77 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
61 In a centralized economy, the default option is a hierarchy—that is, a deci-
sion by a government planner. 
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makes some kind of hierarchical decision structure possible in 
the first place. That is, we should expect to see greater screen-
ing of spectrum-dependent projects or technologies before they 
are launched. 
Which is better is slightly ambigious. For some uses of spec-
trum there may be good arguments for a hierarchical, central-
ized authority who decides what the spectrum will be used for, 
perhaps to ensure public safety. But otherwise, whether we 
want propertized spectrum depends on whether there is any 
argument that spectrum-dependent projects be carefully 
screened.  Absent risk the public, the answer must sometimes 
be no. 
This, of course, cannot be the end of the analysis. But the in-
sights about the strength of decentralized decisionmaking 
should at least make policy makers think carefully before as-
signing rights that might distort the market. 
B. Exceptions 
The study of decision architectures gives us a new way to 
understand the relevance of the major exceptions to copyright 
and patent law. The exceptions have strong decisional conse-
quences. They amount to a governmental decision not to award 
property rights in a narrow instance and can therefore force a 
decentralized decision architecture surrounding the exception. 
For example, in copyright, the contributory rule of Sony v. 
Universal Studios exempts devices with “substantial nonin-
fringing uses,” like VCRs, from liability under copyright.62 This 
rule allocates decisionmaking authority over whether a new 
project that depends on copyrighted works may go forward. In 
practice, it affects whether a manufacturer like Sony or TiVo 
may design products independent of the film industry’s ap-
62 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 441–42, 456 
(1984). The Supreme Court reconsidered and revised this rule in MGM Studios 
v. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 (2005), holding that one who distributes a de-
vice for the purpose of promoting its use to infringe copyright is liable for result-
ing acts of infringement by third parties using the device, despite the device’s 
lawful uses. 
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proval, or whether it must ultimately turn to a centralized in-
dustry for permission.63 
A second example is the allowance of “improvement” patents 
in patent law. Courts have generally allowed later-in-time in-
ventors to receive patents based on significant improvements 
to an existing invention.64 Thomas Edison’s light bulb, for ex-
ample, was not the original invention that is sometimes de-
picted. It was, instead, a significant improvement on previous 
light bulbs that did not last very long.65 The allowance of pat-
ents on improvements has the result of decentralizing 
decisionmaking relevant to an initial invention. Though the 
initial patentee still will own the pioneering invention, it will 
not automatically own subsequent patents on all related in-
ventions.66 
A third example is the exception for parody in copyright’s 
fair use doctrine.67 Under U.S. copyright law, parodies of a 
work may be produced without the permission of the owner.68 
One effect of this doctrine is decisional. Within the industry, 
this allows parodists to decide independently whether they 
want to invest in a parody project. The existence of the excep-
tion may reflect an intuition that the original author will make 
poor assessments of the quality of works intended to humiliate 
the author and degrade his work. 
This Essay suggests that in construing the breadth of excep-
tions to intellectual property rules, a primary consideration 
should be the facilitation of decentralized market entry made 
possible by the exception. In the example of copyright’s fair use 
doctrine, scholars have long argued that fair use is justified by 
market failure. As Professor Wendy Gordon put it, fair use is, 
and should be, employed to permit “uncompensated transfers 
63 See generally Picker, supra note 27 (discussing the application of the Sony 
test for contributory copyright infringement to a variety of digital distribution 
technologies). 
64 See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1000–13. 
65 See The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 470–74 (1895).  
66 See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1009–10. 
67 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
68 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (authorizing a par-
ody of the song “Pretty Woman”). 
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that are socially desirable but not capable of effectuation 
through the market.”69 
While an important insight, what this should mean has 
never been exactly clear, and we might restate the point 
slightly. The analysis here suggests that copyright and patent 
exceptions have a particular urgency when they can open 
markets to decentralized improvement without permitting 
misappropriation of the primary owners’ investments. That 
may not be the only reason for calling usage “fair,” but from 
this Essay’s perspective, it is the most important. In addition 
to the parody exception just discussed, this analysis also sup-
ports the reverse engineering decisions, which prevent a copy-
right holder from using copyright to block prospective improv-
ers of software.70 
Conversely, the analysis here deepens the suspicion that the 
economic (though not moral) case for copyright’s derivative 
work doctrine is weak. In copyright, the fair use doctrine and 
derivative work doctrine operate like twin sisters, respectively 
opening and closing markets to decentralized improvement.  
To take one example, copyright places the right to control 
the development of films based on a novel in the hands of a 
copyright owner. Why the right should be so allocated has 
never been well explained in economic terms, although I grant 
that such rights serve the moral rights of authors. From a 
market perspective, the adaptation right blocks what would 
otherwise be a competitive market in films based on a given 
novel or underlying work.  
As a derivative work doctrine is not necessary to prevent 
primary misappropriation of the copyright work,71 the eco-
69 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 
1601 (1982). 
70 See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding 
reverse engineering of a copyrighted computer program for the purposes of 
study as constituting fair use). 
71 An argument can be made that the adaption right serves the interest of the 
industry as a whole, and therefore, ultimately, the author.  However this is not 
clear, for the absence of the adaptation right would help some parts of the 
entertainment industry and hurt other parts.  It is not clear that in the aggregate that 
entertainment industries would be smaller absent an adaption right. 
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nomic defenses of adaptation rights have relied primarily on 
preventing either races or redundant creation of works.72 For 
example, some argue that if films based on novels were open to 
any market entrant, races to bring films to market may result. 
Similarly, others argue that an oversupply of derivative works 
might lead to redundancy and “rent dissipation.”73 What these 
arguments overlook is the fact that races and redundancy are 
a normal feature of a decentralized market. As we said, two 
gas stations on a single street corner are in a sense redundant, 
but the alternative of a single, national gasoline station system 
is unattractive. Similarly, a decentralized market process is 
full of races. When minivans became popular, car companies 
raced to bring minivans to market. When kung fu becomes 
popular, studios dash to produce martial arts films. Rarely do 
we think government intervention is needed to prevent such 
behavior. 
C. Dead Industries 
A final insight generated by the analysis here relates to 
“dead industries” or stagnant industries where technological 
development appears stalled or nonexistent. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, there are better arguments for assigning new intellec-
tual property rights for such industries than in dynamic or 
growing industries. 
The reasoning is simple: In a dead industry, the dangers of 
distorting a decentralized process of product development are 
minimal. In addition, if profit margins by definition are thin in 
a declining industry, it will be better to have only the very best 
projects come to market. 74 (Stated otherwise, Type II errors 
may have disastrous consequences.) 
72 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copy-
right Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 349 (1989). 
73 See Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy, 9 (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. 
Res., Paper No. 03-03, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=374580. 
74 This is similar to Professor Michael Abramowicz’s argument for strong 
rights in copyright in general: prevention of “redundancy.” Michael Abramowicz, 
An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 
33, 72–75 (2004). I think, however, that Abramowicz is correct only in the de-
clining market context. 
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The incentive and deadweight loss effects of intellectual 
property grants affects this analysis by fortifying the conclu-
sion just reached. As Justice Stephen Breyer and others have 
pointed out, the need to provide incentives for product invest-
ments depends strongly on the availability of returns from the 
market.75 The stronger the market returns, the less govern-
ment encouragement in the form of intellectual property rights 
is needed. In a rapidly expanding industry, firms already have 
strong incentives to bring a new product to market through 
market returns and the advantages of being a first mover. 
Meanwhile, the costs of an overly centralized decisionmaking 
structure are greater. As a result, the desirability of intellec-
tual property rights is at its nadir. In a dead industry, the 
signs are reversed. The returns from the market are weak, so 
government may need to provide incentives to encourage any 
investment in product development at all. The case for strong 
intellectual property rights is at its zenith. 
This analysis of dead industries ignores an important 
point— namely, that the industry may be dead not for inde-
pendent reasons, but because of too many barriers to entry, 
governmental or otherwise. In such a case, adding more rights 
to the picture is unlikely to have the effects just discussed. 
CONCLUSION 
Of then-contemporary economic theory, Fredrick Hayek 
wrote that “there is something fundamentally wrong with an 
approach which habitually disregards an essential part of the 
phenomena with which we have to deal: the unavoidable im-
perfection of man’s knowledge and the consequent need for a 
process by which knowledge is constantly communicated and 
acquired.”76 Much of the economic reasoning surrounding the 
grant of intellectual property rights has suffered from the 
problem Hayek describes. It is implicitly or explicitly based on 
unrealistic ideas of how firms and industries make important 
75 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in 
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 309–13 
(1970). 
76 Hayek, supra note 1, at 530. 
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licensing, innovation and product development decisions. The 
importance of understanding this problem cannot be over-
stated. Intellectual property assignments have become a cen-
tral tool of economic policymaking in the twenty-first century, 
administered across industries like a kind of performance-
enhancing medicine. And as with medicine, a complete under-
standing of both the positive and negative effects of such as-
signments is critical to the design of a rational economic order. 
 
